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The role assigned to me in this discussion is to assess the impact of
regulatory analysis upon judicial review of informal rulemaking. The regula-
tory analysis procedures that have been either (1) actually employed by the
White House pursuant to executive orders or (2) sought to be embodied in
statutes by recent legislative proposals are a reflection of growing concern on
the part of both Congress and the President with the fact that more lawmaking is
being done off Capitol Hill than on it. Neither appears content to leave control
of such lawmaking solely with the courts; each has evinced a desire to have
enhanced capability to affect the rulemaking results.
In organizing my thoughts for this symposium, I was surprised to find
that over four years have elapsed since I first addressed this matter in a
lecture at the Columbia Law School.' At that time I noted that the principal
congressional response to the problem was a widening affinity for the legisla-
tive veto of agency rules and regulations. The movement towards greater
presidential control of this activity was then hardly more than a gleam in
Lloyd Cutler's eye, shining forth from the article he and David Johnson
authored for the Yale Law Journal in 1975.2
Each of these approaches appeared to assume that reliance upon judicial
review was insufficient to assure the protections against rampant rulemaking
that both Congress and the President believed to be needed. Only Senator
Dale Bumpers, who had first introduced his well-known amendment of the
Administrative Procedure Act in 1975,1 seemed to think that the road to
reform lay through expanding and strengthening the reviewing powers of the
courts. I must say that not much has happened in the intervening years,
notwithstanding the intensive consideration by the Congress just ended of a
spate of regulatory reform bills, to affect significantly the nature and scope of
judicial review.
The one visible impact I see on the work of my own court has been
caused by the deregulation achievements of the Carter Administration. No
longer are we afflicted with those absurd air line route cases, in which several
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carriers, each equally capable of providing the service, struggled to persuade
us that the Civil Aeronautics Board had erred in making the certificate award
it did-a result, incidentally, that, without injury to the public interest, it
could as easily and as sensibly have reached by merely flipping a coin. Disap-
pearing fast now are the plethora of motor carrier certification cases in which
the existing truck lines struggle to fend off any new competition. Soon will be
gone many of the railroad appeals from Interstate Commerce Commission
rate orders. And there is reason to hope that Congress will shortly move to
reexamine the regulatory powers of agencies like the Federal Communica-
tions and Federal Maritime Commissions.
This is where the effective action has been recently in regulatory reform,
and it has eliminated much rulemaking as well as adjudication from the
reviewing court calendars. Where deregulation has not occurred, however,
there has been little, if any, change in the nature or extent of judicial review.
The legislative veto, in its various forms of one-house or two-house
action, or by congressional committee, has been increasingly resorted to by
Congress. To the extent the veto is exercised, there is nothing for the courts
to do except, of course, to decide whether the legislative veto itself comports
with the Constitution. The final resolution of that issue has been delayed,
principally because the courts have declined invitations by the executive
branch to invalidate the veto in the abstract, that is to say, in the case where
no one is complaining about an actual exercise of the veto.4
When I explored this subject four years ago at Columbia, there was no
definitive and finally authoritative case law on this subject. I was told then
that the Government had a case pending in the Ninth Circuit, involving the
veto by the House of Representatives of a deportation order, in which resolu-
tion of the constitutional issue could not be escaped. Last week-and this
says a lot about the problems of the courts of appeals generally as well as of
the Ninth Circuit in particular-the case, Chadha v. Immigration and Natu-
ralization Service, 5 was decided.
The veto exercised in that instance was held invalid as violative of "the
4. See, e.g., Clark v. Valeo, 559 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc), aff'd mem. sub nom. Clark v. Kimmitt,
431 U.S. 950 (1977).
5. 634 F.2d 408 (9th Cir. 1980). An appeal was filed by the Government in the Supreme Court on May 1,
1981 (No. 80-1832). Since the Government and Chadha are in agreement that the legislative veto brought to bear
in that case is invalid, the Senate and the House of Representatives have separately intervened in the appeal,
and are urging its dismissal on the grounds that the Government, as the prevailing party, lacks standing to
invoke the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1252 (1976) and that the parties lack the
adversity required by article III for a justiciable case or controversy.
The House and Senate have also filed separate petitions for certiorari: United States House of Representa-
tives v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 50 U.S.L.W. 3001 (U.S. June 22, 1981) (No. 80-2170); United
States Senate v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 50 U.S.L.W. 3001 (U.S. June 22, 1981) (No. 80-2171).
The petitions raise a number of issues other than the constitutionality of the one-house veto, including the
contention that the Ninth Circuit need not have reached that issue because Chadha had married an American
citizen after the challenged deportation order and was thus eligible for permanent residence. Petition for Cert. in
No. 80-2171 at 12-13. See also Chadha v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 634 F.2d 403, 417 n.6 (9th
Cir. 1980).
The houses of Congress also assert that the Ninth Circuit decided the legislative veto issue without the
benefit of a justiciable controversy because neither Chadha nor the Government defended the constitutionality
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constitutional doctrine of the separation of powers because it is a prohibited
legislative intrusion upon the Executive and Judicial branches." In a Christ-
mas Eve statement, President Carter hailed the present handed him by the
Ninth Circuit as having "perhaps the most profound significance constitu-
tionally" of any case handed down during his term of office, since it assert-
edly ended a forty year battle between the executive branch and Congress
over the reach of their respective powers.
Of course, prolonged disagreements of this constitutional magnitude do
not normally end in a single court of appeals or in a single case, but this
decision may conceivably be the vehicle of a Supreme Court ruling. If that
ruling is a sweeping affirmance, then perhaps control of rulemaking by veto
will no longer be available to Congress.6 One alternative still available to it,
obviously, is to keep the lawmaking power in its own hands and not to dele-
gate it to either independent or executive branch agencies as broadly as it has
been in the habit of doing. Perhaps a more likely congressional response-
despite Justice Rehnquist's recent warning about broad delegation in the
OSHA benzene case--is to continue its wide-ranging delegations and to
strengthen judicial review of the resulting agency rules.
A development of the last-mentioned character could presumably
breathe some life into the apparently dormant Bumpers Amendment, al-
though any really good idea in this limited field ought not to require six years
for its time to come. Certainly at the time of its first unveiling in 1975, it did
not seem like a good idea at all to some of the academic pundits of administra-
tive law, as well as to many private lawyers practicing in the field. It got its
first lift when the House of Delegates of the American Bar Association,
stampeded by a jury speech about the iniquities of the federal bureaucracy,
surprised and confounded its Section of Administrative Law by rejecting the
latter's strong recommendation against endorsement. Emboldened by this
unexpected support, Senator Bumpers shortly thereafter moved successfully
on the Senate Floor to add his amendment to the Justice Department's bill for
improvements in the federal judiciary. Managing that bill as Chairman of the
Judiciary Committee, Senator Kennedy ardently opposed the amendment,
but again the popular tide was running against the rulemakers, and, to the
great distaste of its sponsors, the bill as amended was passed by the Senate.
Since then a tedious and prolonged bout of trading words for inclusion in
of the veto before that tribunal. If the Supreme Court grants certiorari in either case, and accepts one or both of
these arguments, it will have the option of vacating the Ninth Circuit decision and remanding Chadha's case to
the Immigration and Naturalization Service without the necessity of reaching the legislative veto question.
6. Chadha involved a veto by the House of Representatives of a decision by the Immigration and
Naturalization Board of Appeals to suspend a deportation order on a showing of special hardship by the
deportee. Thus, the veto in this instance had some flavor, which did not go unnoticed by the court of appeals, of
legislative interference with a quasi-judicial act by an agency within the executive branch. The legislative veto
may conceivably be on stronger ground when exercised with respect to laws in the form of regulations emerging
from informal rulemaking pursuant to lawmaking power expressly delegated by Congress.
7. Industrial Union Dep't., AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 671-88 (1980)
(Rehnquist, J., concurring).
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and exclusion from the amendment has gone on in connection with the regula-
tory reform bills considered at the last session. But agreement among those
necessary to its enactment by Congress was not reached, and the session
ended with the Bumpers Amendment still in the legislative limbo.'
8. The Bumpers Amendment is now before the first session of the 97th Congress as part of S. 1080, the
Regulatory Reform Act introduced by Senator Laxalt and 75 of his colleagues, and reads as follows:
§ 706. Scope of review
(a) To the extent necessary to decision and when presented, the reviewing court shall indepen-
dently decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, and
determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency action.
(c) In making determinations under clause (2)(C) of subsection (a) of this section [that agency
action is in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations], the court shall require that action
by the agency is within the scope of the agency jurisdiction or authority on the basis of the language of
the statute or, in the event of ambiguity, other evidence of legislative intent. In making determinations
on other questions of law, the court shall not accord any presumption in favor of or against agency
action.
Testifying on May 14, 1981, before the Subcommittee on Regulatory Reform of the Senate Judiciary
Committee, one administration spokesman-James C. Miller, III, Executive Director of the Presidential Task
Force on Regulatory Relief-had this to say about the Bumpers Amendment provision in S. 1030:
In connection with judicial review, we should add one point about the Bumpers Amendment. We
believe that the bill's provisions eliminating any presumption of validity with respect to an agency's
assertion of power or jurisdiction beyond its statutory authorization raise no serious problem. Indeed,
under the Executive Order we are committed to achieving this same objective. But other presumptions
not involving agency jurisdiction or power-such as those relating to procedural regularity, statutory
interpretation of technical or scientific provisions, and an agency's own rules-serve a useful purpose
in focusing judicial review on the issues of significance. Moreover, elimination of those presumptions
could create needless uncertainties and litigation.
Deputy Attorney General Schmults, testifying on May 14, 1981, before the Subcommittee on Administra-
tive Law and Governmental Relations of the House Judiciary Committee on H.R. 746, a regulatory reform bill
containing a Bumpers-type provision, characterized the proposal as "troubling," and went on to say:
The first sentence of proposed section 706(c) would remove existing presumptions favoring the validity
of agency actions with regard to "questions of law." This is a very broad category. "Questions of law"
would include questions of constitutionality, procedural interpretation, and procedural regularity, as
well as statutory law. Courts have long presumed the constitutionality of agency action for the same
reason that they presume the constitutionality of legislation-to avoid unnecessary intrusions into the
decisions of a coordinate branch of government. With regard to procedures, the Supreme Court has
recently emphasized the need for courts to recognize the agencies' discretion to choose the procedures
best suited to performing their assigned tasks, consistent, of course, with procedures prescribed by
statute. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S.
519 (1978). And an agency, as draftsman, surely should be accorded some deference as to the meaning
of its own regulations.
Turning to statutory authority and statutory interpretation, the agency that works with a statute
undoubtedly has valuable insight into how that statute's terms are most sensibly and efficiently to be
interpreted. The deference that properly flows from that circumstance, however, is not allowed to
overcome the plain wording of a statute, or the result pointed to by legislative history. The proposed
amendment would require that decisions on statutory authority be based entirely on the language of the
statute or other ascertainable legislative intent. All we would urge is that the Congress intends that its
laws be efficiently carried out; and that, where an agency interprets its organic statute in a way it
believes most faithful to Congressional intent, that judgment is valuable for a court to consider. Such
an agency ruling is entitled to deference ....
... [Jiudicial deference to Executive interpretations, within reason and ascertainable legislative
intent, is a critical part of the Executive's practical discretion on a day-to-day level. Since statutes do
not generally resolve all the myriad problems of administrative interpretation, the Executive must have
some power to act interstitially.
In conclusion, I would like to sound a general warning about efforts to cure administrative
deficiences: it will be a rare case where such remedy is found in increasing the role of the reviewing
courts. With the abandonment of deference to the administrative agency, the opportunity for creative
interpretation of laws and regulations, and independent weighing of facts, looms great for the judiciary.
It is almost a truism that what your bill takes from administrative agencies, it gives to courts.
Another version of the Bumpers Amendment, drafted perhaps as a partial response to the comments of the
Deputy Attorney General, would direct a reviewing court to forbear reliance upon the agency's own legal
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In his last statement at the session in support of his revised amendment,
Senator Bumpers quoted with satisfaction from one of my court's recent
cases in which we, after considering the language of the statute and its under-
lying legislative history, held that to uphold the grant of statutory authority
claimed by the agency would be "an unwarranted judicial intrusion upon the
legislative sphere wholly at odds with the democratic processes of lawmaking
contemplated by the Constitution."-9
Since I wrote those words, I can only assume that Senator Bumpers can
have no quarrel with the way I go about interpreting agency statutes. And I
see nothing in the amendment, even as revised, that would stop me from going
about the interpretative job in the way I like to think I always have.' When I
have, accordingly, questioned the need for the amendment, I have been told
by its proponents that, however innocuous the language of the amendment may
turn out to be, the very fact of its enactment will send what is variously
termed a "signal" or "message" to the federal judges to shape up and stop
rubber stamping the agencies' rulemaking.
Congress has presumably more important work to do than merely to
transmit "signals" or "messages" about judicial attitudes. If it persists in
this, however, Congress should make sure that its signal is strong enough to
reach-and to be obeyed by-the Supreme Court. Recently the Court un-
animously reversed the Fourth Circuit in a case" taken for review because of a
conflict between it and a case of mine called Weyerhaeuser v. EPA,'2 in which
we upheld the agency's construction of its statutory authority. In justifying
its holding that "the Administrator has adopted a reasonable construction of
the statutory mandate" and that "the [Fourth Circuit] Court of Appeals erred
in not accepting EPA's interpretation of the Act," the Supreme Court con-
cluded its opinion by saying that "[ijt is by now a commonplace that 'when
faced with a problem of statutory construction, this Court shows great defer-
ence to the interpretation given the statute by the officers charged with its
administration,' -13 citing, and quoting from, only Udall v. Tallman.'4
judgment only in matters of"statutory jurisdiction or authority." Since the agency's determinations on all other
questions would continue to enjoy a traditional measure of deference, the enactment of this language could
present the courts with the nice question of when an agency's application of a vague statute to particular facts is
a determination of its jurisdiction. It could be argued, for example, that the NLRB's decision that certain
newsboys were "employees" and thus entitled to participate in collective bargaining under the Wagner Act,
NLRB v. Hearst Publications, 322 U.S. II 1! (1944), was jurisdictional in nature.
9. Lubrizol Corp. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 562 F.2d 806, 820 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
10. The District of Columbia Circuit has recently held that an agency's assertion ofjurisdiction is subject to
especially close scrutiny. Office of Consumers' Counsel v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 655 F.2d 1132
(D.C. Cir. 1980). In concluding that FERC lacked jurisdiction under the Natural Gas Act to regulate synthetic
gas facilities, the court distinguished that "'legal issue" from other questions, such as determinations ofjust and
reasonable rates, that implicate the Commission's "expertise or specialized judgment." Id. at 1141. In the
former instance, Judge Wald said, "[T]his court has the preeminent responsibility to independently scrutinize
and decide all jurisdictional issues." Id. at 1142.
11. Environmental Protection Agency v. National Crushed Stone Assoc., 449 U.S. 611 (1980).
12. 590 F.2d 1001 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
13. 449 U.S. 64, 83 (1980).
14. 380 U.S. 1, 16 (1965).
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When Udall was decided 16 years ago, it made a peculiarly strong im-
pression on me because it was the first case I sat on which was reversed by
the Supreme Court. "Deference" to an agency's construction of its statute is
perhaps not the happiest way to formulate a reviewing court's proper
approach to that construction, but I learned the hard way early on that, as an
inferior court judge, if you are going to knock over the agency's reading, you
had better be sure you are right.
The focus of our interest this morning is upon the third of the rulemaking
control mechanisms briefly canvassed in my 1977 inquiry: presidential control
of delegated lawmaking. At that time, such control was in an incipient stage of
development. President Nixon had moved in this direction as early as 1971
with an executive order creating the so-called "quality of life" review of
proposed health and safety regulations prior to publication for comment. That
review was spearheaded by the Office of Management and Budget, which
collected the views of other affected agencies, with the President, if neces-
sary, finally calling the shots as to whether they should go forward. But that
program was of limited reach and, so far as I am aware, entailed no conse-
quences with respect to the scope of judicial review.
President Ford in 1974 acted by executive order to require the executive
branch agencies to prepare economic impact statements showing the cost
increases attendant upon the proposed rules and the possibility of cheaper
alternatives. This order was eventually succeeded by President Carter's
Executive Order No. 12,044 in 1978, under which each agency in the execu-
tive branch issuing rules or regulations was directed to file an initial regulatory
analysis at the time a rule was noticed for comment and a final regulatory
analysis at the time of promulgation. That order explicitly envisaged no role
for judicial review of these analyses or of the procedures by which they came
into being. The analyses were to be available for a reviewing court's informa-
tion as part of the rulemaking record.
5
15. President Carter's executive order was itself succeeded by Executive Order 12,291, 64 Fed. Reg.
13,193 (1981), issued by President Reagan on February 17. In many respects the scheme outlined by President
Reagan's order is similar to that adopted by the Carter Administration. Still limited in scope to executive branch
agencies, the new executive order maintains the notion of a preliminary and final regulatory analysis when rules
are published in proposed and final form respectively. The new administration requires that an agency consider-
ing a "'major" rule, defined as one whose impact on the economy is likely to exceed $100 million, which will
likely raise costs or prices, which will significantly impede business, or which is so denominated by the Director
of the Office of Management and Budget, id. § l(b), 6(a)(1), must include in its notice of proposed rulemeking
and publication of the final rule a description of the costs, benefits, and net of benefit over cost of the rule,
together with an analysis of alternative approaches that "could substantially achieve the same regulatory goal at
lower cost," and why such alternatives were rejected. Id. § 3(d). The Carter approach had required analysis of
the economic consequences of the rule and its alternatives, but had not required explicit cost/benefit analysis.
Executive Order 12,044, § 3(b), 43 Fed. Reg. 12,661 (1978).
Another difference of significance between the new and old regulatory oversight plans lies in the larger role
assigned by the Reagan Administration to the Office of Management and Budget. The Carter order had not given
OMB any authority to review particular regulatory analyses, although it did have authority to approve agency
plans for implementation of the executive order. Id. § 5. In contrast, the Reagan executive order vests in OMB
the power to review preliminary and final regulatory analyses and to require an agency response to any
comments offered by OMB. Executive Order 12,291, § 3(f). As part of those comments, OMB may require the
agency "to obtain and evaluate .. any additional relevant data from any appropriate source." Id. § 6(a)(3).
Both executive orders stated that their regulatory analysis provisions were not intended to provide new
[Vol. 42:627
REGULATOR Y ANAL YSIS
Public support for the concept of greater control by the executive of
rulemaking was greatly enhanced by the report of the ABA's Commission on
Law and the Economy, which was approved by the House of Delegates on the
same day the Bumpers Amendment got through that body. That report, influ-
enced strongly by the Cutler thesis, contemplated, in respect of Presidential
action either before or after the agency rulemaking process had taken place,
an elaborate statute under which all three branches of the government would
have a role, although it left ambiguities as to the effect on judicial review of
the participation of the Congress and the President.
A separate proposal by the Commission involved no statute but rather
the voluntary institution by the President of regulatory analysis procedures
substantially like those being pursued under President Carter's Executive
Order No. 12,044. That proposal contemplated the usual judicial review of the
final rule's compliance with the substantive and procedural requirements of
the agency's governing statute, but such review was explicitly not to extend
to the adequacy of the regulatory analysis or other observance, or alleged
nonobservance, of the standards and procedures ordered by the President to
be followed for intra-executive branch illumination of the rulemaking process.
The significance of what the ABA Commission's report provided with
respect to judicial review was minimized by the quick shift in attention from
that report to the legislative proposals made to the last Congress to implement
its objectives. The 96th Congress saw a variety of bills relating to rulemaking.
The one that emerged as the most likely candidate for enactment was S.
262, which was considered by both the Senate Committee on Governmental
Affairs and the Judiciary Committee. Its regulatory analysis provisions
followed closely the pattern of Executive Order 12,044 in requiring, in respect
of "major" rules, both an initial regulatory analysis on the institution of
notice and comment, and a final regulatory analysis upon promulgation. The
bill expressly precluded judicial review, both with respect to (1) agency
determinations with respect to the applicability of the statute, including
whether a rule is "major" or not within the statutory definition of that term,
and (2) the regulatory analyses themselves and the compliance vel non of the
agency with the procedures prescribed for preparing and filing such analyses.
It provided, however, that the regulatory analyses are to be part of the
record in any action for judicial review of a promulgated rule, and that "the
contents of a regulatory analysis shall, to the extent relevant, be considered
by a court when determining the validity" of the rule. In empowering the
agency, in its consideration of a major rule, to employ hearing procedures
beyond those otherwise required by law, the bill was at pains to state that the
agency's decision to invoke, or not to invoke, this authority, and the choice of
grounds for judicial review. Executive Order 12,044, § 7; Executive Order 12,291, § 9 (it is "not intended to
create any right or benefit... enforceable at law... against the United States .... or any person"). The
Reagan scheme also provides that the regulatory analyses are to be placed in the rulemaking record, forjudicial,
as well as public, inspection. Id.
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one or more of the procedures so authorized, "shall be within the sole and
unreviewable discretion of the agency."
It seems fairly clear that the current mood of the Congress is to keep the
courts out of controversies over the way an agency has gone about performing
its regulatory analysis responsibilities. Certainly, it is plain from the com-
mittee reports that litigation over such questions is not to delay judicial
disposition of challenges to the merits of the rules as promulgated. That this
may be the purpose of the Congress as a whole is evident from one regulatory
reform statute that did emerge from the 96th Congress in its closing days,
namely, the Regulatory Flexibility Act, approved September 19, 1980, effec-
tive January 1, 1981.
This law provides for what it calls initial and final regulatory flexibility
analyses, the purpose of which is to tailor regulations to the special circum-
stances of small businesses, small organizations, and small governmental
jurisdictions, as those are defined in the law. Judicial review is expressly
precluded in a manner virtually identical with that used in S. 262.
It would appear from the foregoing that the future statutory deployment
of regulatory analysis as a regulatory reform measure will not in all likelihood
enlarge the present reviewing responsibilities of the courts. What may be of
interest to think about is the extent to which the presence in the record before
the court of the initial and final regulatory analyses may affect the court's
judgment as to the rule's validity. These analyses would be simply additional
matters for the court to consider in performing its function of reviewing the
substance of agency action under the arbitrary or capricious standard.
It may well be that, if such analyses are well done, the agencies will be
less vulnerable to judicial scrutiny. The statutory prescriptions of the con-
siderations to be explored in the analyses deal with such matters as the need
for, and the objectives of, the proposed rule, the specification of a reasonable
number of significant alternatives to the rule, and the projected economic
effects, including costs and economic benefits-and the projected health,
safety, environmental, and other effects-that may result from the rule. At its
broadest, a cost-benefit study arguably bears directly on the rationality of a
rule; and a favorable cost-benefit ratio could tend to underscore a lack of
arbitrariness on the part of the agency.
Rigorous regulatory analysis of the kind contemplated by S. 262 could,
indeed, be of great help to a reviewing court in coming to grips with what is for
the court the hardest part of its reviewing task, namely, review of the substan-
tive aspects of a rule under the arbitrary or capricious standard. Because of
the frequently arcane and complex subject matters that many of the agencies
today are required to address in informal rulemaking, the reviewing courts
need all the aids to understanding they can get; informed and expert regula-
tory analyses can be very useful in this regard. They may even convince the
agency itself that it is barking up the wrong tree, and thus there may not even
be a rule to review, thereby enabling a court of appeals to reduce its backlog
of Title VII and Freedom of Information Act appeals.
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Executive intervention in the rulemaking process by regulatory analysis,
whether it be under statutory direction or by executive order, may create at
least one serious problem that derives from what may happen after the
notice and comment period is over but before promulgation. This, of course,
is the so-called "ex parte contacts" problem. It stands to reason that the
executive or presidential interest does not end once the initial and final regula-
tory analyses are filed. Indeed, it presumably is all the more intense as the
agency ponders its decision. A private citizen is free to call up his congress-
man and tell him in the strongest terms how he should vote on a pending bill.
What are, or should be, the limits upon the President's communication of
views to his subordinates engaged in the exercise of delegated lawmaking
powers by informal rulemaking?
Two cases presently under submission in our court dramatically pose this
problem. Since I am on neither panel, I can relate only what I gleaned from
looking at the briefs. Both have arisen after the inception of the Executive
Order 12,044 regulatory analysis program.
In one, the so-called ozone case, American Petroleum Institute v.
Costle,"6 petitioner National Resources Defense Council (NRDC) insists that
an EPA regulation has been fatally flawed by contacts and discussions during
the post-comment period between two members of the Council of Economic
Advisors and the Chairman of the Council on Wage and Price Stability,
accompanied by their staffs, and the EPA Administrator and his people. The
Regulatory Analysis Review Group had filed its final analysis on the last day
of the comment period, and four other memoranda memorializing meetings
between EPA and the White House staff had been put in the rulemaking
record shortly thereafter. But the other meetings I have referred to became
known only after inquiries were made by a Senate subcommittee and by
reason of Freedom of Information Act requests by NRDC. It appeared from
these disclosures that EPA had been urged to relax the standard proposed,
and the regulation as issued was in fact weaker than it had been when noticed
for comment.
The Government argues that the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977
distinguished between executive branch officials, on the one hand, and
"interested" persons outside the executive branch, on the other. The latter,
said the Government, must submit their written or oral communications to
EPA for the record during the comment period. Contrarily, in the Govern-
ment's submission, intra-executive branch communications may be made
after the comment period; and, of these, only written comments and written
responses, not oral discussions, are required to be included in the record to be
reviewed.
This case may turn on interpretation of the Clean Air Act. Both sides
appealed to it, and neither cited any cases.
16. No. 79-1104 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 3, 1981) (slip op.). The court, Judge Wald dissenting, did not reach the
merits of the ex parte contacts issue, holding instead that NRDC could and should have raised this procedural
objection in a petition for reconsideration. Id. at 29-30.
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The other case, Sierra Club v. Costle,7 involved performance standards
for sulfur dioxide emissions from new coal-fired plants. The rulemaking
started in 1978, and the comment period closed on January 15, 1979. Peti-
tioner Environmental Defense Fund asserts that, in the post-comment but
pre-decision period, the National Coal Association started a blitz to reverse
the agency's idea of the proper emission ceiling, which had leaked to the
outside world, enlisting members of Congress, as well as policy makers in the
Department of Energy and the White House. EPA scheduled one meeting
with the National Coal Association that petitioner was invited to, and did,
attend. But EPA is said to have had six meetings during April of that year with
congressmen and Administration officials, to which neither petitioner nor the
National Resources Defense Council was invited. Senator Byrd of West
Virginia was at one such meeting, along with Stuart Eizenstat of the White
House staff, and a representative of the National Coal Association. It was
claimed that the Deputy Secretary of the Department of Energy was also used
by the National Coal Association as a conduit to transmit technical informa-
tion to EPA during the post-comment period, as were several congressmen.
In any event, the rule as issued was more favorable to the industry than was
EPA's reputed earlier position.
I happily leave the immediate resolution of these issues to my col-
leagues, s and relate here the circumstances publicly pressed upon them as
making more concrete, for the purposes of this discussion, the problems that
may attend upon executive intervention in the rulemaking process, however
limited that intervention may start out to be.
The law of ex parte contacts in informal rulemaking is in a parlous and
inconclusive state indeed. Certainly that is true in my circuit, even after a few
17. No. 79-1565 (D.C. Cir. April 29, 1981) (slip op.).
18. The District of Columbia Circuit handed down a decision in the Sierra Club case on April 29. Although
most of the panel's 253-page opinion concerns the technical challenges to the final EPA rule, the court did
discuss in some detail petitioner Environmental Defense Fund's challenge to that regulation based upon meet-
ings between EPA officials and other interested persons, such as congressmen, industry representatives, and
executive branch officials, including the President, that took place after the time for comments had expired.
The court determined that these meetings did not offend either the procedural review provisions of the
Clean Air Act or the due process clause. Noting that, unlike some other statutes, the Clean Air Act did not ban
such exparte contacts, No. 79-1565, slip op. at 192, the court said they need only be noted in the docket if EPA
determines that they were of signal relevance to the proceedings. Id. at 207-12. The opinion relied upon the
legislative character of informal rulemaking in concluding that the agency could confer with congressmen and
executive branch officials, including the President, as part of its effort to glean public sentiment and frame
responsive regulations. Id. at 209-24.
The similarity of informal rulemaking to the legislative process also led the court to dispatch EDF's due
process argument. Judge Vald wrote:
Where agency action resembles judicial action, where it involves formal rulemaking, adjudication, or
quasi-adjudication among "'conflicting private claims to a valuable privilege," the insulation of the
decisionmaker from ex parte contacts is justified by basic notions of due process to the parties
involved. But where agency action involves informal rulemaking ofa policymaking sort, the concept of
ex parte contacts is of more questionable utility.
Id. at 202-03 (footnotes omitted). The court went on to contend that the legitimacy of delegating broad legisla-
tive authority to administrative agencies depends upon their receptivity and responsiveness to the public,
leaving open the inference that elected officials have a role to play in bringing the interests of the public to the
attention of administrators. Id. at 203-04.
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ventures into the field. I refer you on this score to Paul Verkuil's article in the
current Columbia Law Review,' 9 which is the most comprehensive recent
discussion of the problem that I have encountered. It, as a research study
prepared for the Administrative Conference of the United States, supplied the
basis for the recent action of that Conference last month in approving a formal
recommendation on this subject limited to informal rulemaking by executive
branch agencies. 0
The substance of that recommendation was that the rulemaking agency
"should be free to receive written or oral policy advice and recommendations
at any time from the President, advisors to the President, the Executive Office
to the President, and other agencies, without having a duty to disclose these
intragovernmental communications." This principle was, however, qualified
by an exception to the effect that, to the extent that such communications
"contain material factual information (as distinct from indications of govern-
mental policy) pertaining to or affecting a proposed rule .. . " the agency
should promptly place copies of the written, or summaries of the oral, com-
munications in the rulemaking file. The conduit problem is taken into account
by the recommendation in a provision that all communications from intra-
governmental sources containing or reflecting comments by persons outside
the government should be so identified and placed in the public file regardless
of the nature of their contents.
The Conference was far from unanimous in its approval of this recom-
mendation, although I think it was recognized generally as a serious and
substantial contribution to our thinking about this difficult subject. As ajudge,
I can see in it a potential for much litigation over what is factual information as
distinct from governmental policy, but that is the kind of work which judges
are paid to do-always, of course, within the wise and prophetic protection
provided by the Constitution against reduction of our compensation while in
office.
I think it likely that ambivalence will continue to pervade the ex parte
contacts problem until we face up to the question of whether legislation by
informal rulemaking under delegated authority is, in terms of process, to be
assimilated to lawmaking by the Congress itself, or to the adversary trial
carried on in the sanitized and insulated atmosphere of the courthouse. Any-
one with experience of both knows that a courtroom differs markedly in style
and tone from a legislative chamber. The customs, the traditions, the mores, if
you please, of the processes of persuasion are emphatically not the same.
What is acceptable in the one is alien to the other. We should at least not be
surprised if we encounter difficulties when lawmaking is delegated to be done
by outsiders, but under a process for which the virtue is claimed that it is like
that of the legislature itself.
19. Verkuil, Jawboning Administrative Agencies: Ex Parte Contacts by the White House, 80 COLUM. L.
REV. 943 (1980).
20. 1980 ADMINISTRATIVE CONF. OF THE U.S., INTERGOVERNMENTAL COMMUNICATIONS IN
INFORMAL RULEMAKING PROCEEDINGS, Recommendation 80-6, at 68-70 (1981) (adopted Dec. 12, 1980).
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